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Only a handful of scholars have written
long-term histories of gambling and an even
smaller number have attempted to make
historical comparisons between different
countries. 1 But gambling has a long history,
and one that is not confined to a particular
continent or time period. In this paper I hope
to demonstrate some of the benefits of
looking at the history of gambling through a
(very) wide lens, by comparing the
development of gambling in Britain during
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
with the emergence of gambling in Nevada

during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Of course, I am not
saying that we should attempt to draw direct
parallels between two cases that are
separated by such a substantial chronological
and spatial divide; rather what I hope to show
is the existence of similar themes and ideas in
different contexts. Focusing principally on
gambling games played with cards and dice,
this paper begins by examining approaches to
taxing gaming before moving on to consider
regulatory strategies.
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Taking a gamble on tax
Historically, taxing gambling has posed
both moral and legal problems, for how can
the state be seen to profit from an activity
that is frequently condemned as immoral and
is partly or wholly illegal?

In England 1711 marked the beginning of
a centralised and systematic tax on gaming. 2
However, this was not a tax on gaming per se,
but on the instruments of gaming, namely
cards and dice. By the 1680s, gambling at
card games was so popular that over one
million packs of cards were being produced
every year (we don’t have figures for dice)
and therefore gaming presented a substantial
potential revenue stream, if it could be
tapped effectively. 3 At this time the majority
of gaming was technically illegal (more on
which later) and so a system of licensing
could not be adopted. And in the absence of
licensed premises, not to mention the huge
logistical challenge in a pre-industrial state, it
was impossible to tax the turnover from
gaming. Thus taxing each pack of cards and
bale of dice at point of manufacture, with the
additional cost to the manufacturer being
passed on to the consumer, was the most—
and only—practical option. 4 The problem
was that playing card making was a lowly
occupation and manufacturers only realised a
small profit on each pack of cards. So when
the cardmakers faced a twenty-four fold tax
increase in 1711, something had to give.
Some went out of business; others managed
to pay the new taxes because the demand for
cards remained high. A third, smaller, group
engaged in tax fraud by forging the
government stamps that showed the tax had
been paid. This was lucrative, but very risky:
in 1743 Thomas Hill was sentenced to death
for selling ‘four or five thousand’ packs of
cards with counterfeit tax stamps. In Nevada,
by contrast, people who wanted to operate
gambling games paid for licenses, which had
to be approved by the local authorities: the
cost of the license usually depended on the
number of games requested, and I will
discuss the process in more detail below.
Only legal games could be licensed (there was

a list) and, before 1931, there were times
when all gambling was criminalised, most
famously in 1910 (though these strictures
were gradually relaxed during the following
years). 5

What are the wider implications of these
approaches? In England, a small amount of
tax had in fact been levied on cards before
1711; but it was so small that the revenue
generated was negligible. The explosion of
card games during the seventeenth century
and the massive expansion of the playing card
industry meant that taxing gaming
systematically could now be profitable. But it
was the economic context of the early 1700s
that resulted in the new, much higher,
centralised tax on cards actually being
implemented. In short, England was fighting
extremely expensive wars in continental
Europe and the government needed the
money: this pattern of increasing the tax on
cards (and other items) was repeated during
both the Seven Years War (1756-63) and the
American War of Independence.

As well as the laws against gaming in
England there were sustained religious and
moral objections to gambling as numerous
contemporary tracts and pamphlets illustrate.
Yet these factors did not stop gaming, through
the tax on playing cards and dice, from
becoming a substantial source of revenue for
the government. 6 Some justification was
provided by the argument that card
manufacturing was a legitimate industry
(cards, after all, didn’t have to be used for
gambling games, although most were);7
likewise, it was argued that cards and dice
were not ‘necessary’ items and were
therefore ripe for taxation. 8 This didn’t really
solve the moral/tax dichotomy, but what is
interesting is that by the eighteenth century
an earlier argument suggesting that high
taxes on cards and dice would prevent the
poor from gambling (thus backing up the
anti-gaming legislation) had disappeared
from official rhetoric. 9
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In Nevada, perhaps the weightiest and
most repeated argument for allowing gaming
was that licensing brought in much-needed
revenue and that, more broadly, gaming
would create business opportunities and
growth. 10 Yet in the early years of the
twentieth century a highly organised and
sustained campaign against gaming, driven by
moral concerns, successfully undermined the
economic pro-gaming argument. 11 In fact,
argued the anti-gambling lobby, the
combined costs of policing and losses to
members of the local community were
greater than the revenue raised from
licensing. Moreover, in the economic climate
of 1909/10 it was asserted that the ‘the
assessed valuation from mining and
agricultural activities was high enough so that
license revenues were no longer needed’. 12
For a time, therefore, anti-gambling
arguments held sway: as late as 1925 there
was a ‘lack of enthusiasm for “open
gambling”’, while in 1927 two thirds of the
committee members of the Las Vegas
Chamber of Commerce remained opposed to
it. 13 But at the same time, it should be noted,
the City of Las Vegas continued to raise
money from gaming licenses: between
October 1927 and October 1928 some $3500
was collected, whereas a year later this had
increased to $7300. 14 Licenses were still
restricted to a narrow range of social games
(see below), a situation that was far removed
from the ‘wide open’ legislation that would be
passed only a few years later. But what
caused this additional step? Although
‘gamblers and the operators of economically
allied business’ had long desired ‘wide open’
gambling, it was the wider economic context
of the Great Depression that persuaded ‘a
larger economic (and political) interest
group, the Nevada business community, and a
relatively small one consisting of the state’s
local governments’ that they would benefit
from such a significant change in the law. 15
Thus in 1931, ‘wide-open’ gambling came to
Nevada and the rest, as they say, is history.
What I want to emphasise here is that
although moral concerns continued to be
raised about gambling in England and
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Nevada, we can see in both cases that these
concerns were ultimately outweighed by
economic conditions and, subsequently, the
revenue that could be generated from taxing
gambling.

Regulatory strategies

Since the sixteenth century, England had
adopted a policy of prohibition as regards
gambling; though this depended largely on
who you were. The key Act was passed in
1541, and it stipulated: ‘That no Manner of
Artificer or Craftsman of any Handicraft or
Occupation, Husbandman, Apprentice,
Labourer, Servant at Husbandry, Journeyman,
or Servant of Artificer, mariners, Fishermen,
Watermen, or any Serving-man shall... play at
the Tables, Tennis, Dice, Cards, Bowls, Clash,
Coyting, Logating, or any other unlawful
Game out of Christmas’. 16 That the criteria
were social and occupational status
demonstrates clearly that the government
wished to prevent people who were
dependant on waged work and the poor in
general from playing at cards, dice and other
games: this is not an unfamiliar perspective,
even today. At the same time, operating and
‘resorting to’ a gaming house were made
offences, by whomever they were
committed. 17 The purpose of the gaming
house legislation was to dissuade large
numbers of (in the eyes of the legislators)
idle, and potentially disorderly, people
gathering together to play games;
importantly, legislators also sought to
prevent gaming from becoming a commercial
or profit-making activity. Further laws passed
during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries forbade particular games
(irrespective of social status), imposed strict
penalties for cheating, and imposed limits on
the amount of money players could stake at
any one time. Punishments included both
fines and imprisonment, with proprietors
subject to tougher sentences than players.
Policing such a wide-ranging ban on
gaming was virtually impossible, however.
Prosecutions were sporadic and only tended
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to occur during times of moral panic, or when
illegal gaming houses were causing disorder,
or when reforming individuals or groups took
a concerted stand against illegal gaming. 18
This was because most gaming was probably
fairly low key and not a major priority in the
eyes of the authorities. The exception was
highly specialized gaming houses. Though
rare, these illegal institutions emerged in
England in the early decades of the
eighteenth century. They had multiple tables,
offered banking games, and were open to
anyone who could afford to play (these were
not the exclusive clubs patronised by the
aristocracy and political elites). Specialized
gaming houses therefore flaunted the antigaming laws and embodied reformers’ and
justices’ fears about vice, crime, and disorder;
accordingly, the authorities tried to close
them down. But this could be difficult and
dangerous: in 1721 a group of constables
were attacked by a mob when they arrived at
Vandernan’s gaming house in Covent Garden,
London. 19

The stark realities of enforcing antigaming laws brings us to Nevada.
Between the mid-nineteenth century and
1931 there were repeated oscillations in
the gaming laws. 20 As a result of
legislation passed in 1861 and 1865,
gambling was outlawed on principally
moral grounds (consider my opening
quotation). As in England, though, total
prohibition ‘remained unenforced and
unenforceable’. 21 It was for this reason
that measures providing for licensing and
control were proposed in Nevada, though
these were blocked until 1869.
Thereafter, and in spite of opposition—
note, for instance, the ‘Act to Prohibit the
Winning of Money from Persons who
have No Right to Gamble it Away’—
various types of gaming remained legal. 22
In the early twentieth century there were,
as Earl has documented, fierce debates
between pro- and anti-gambling lobbies,
with the latter securing an outright ban

on all gambling commencing on 1 October
1910.

The 1909 law (in force from 1910) is
worthy of remark for its impressively
tough stance. To quote Moody’s summary:
Any violation of the … provisions
was to be punished as a felony, with
the convicted lawbreaker going to
state prison for from one to five years.
Also, any individual who knowingly
permitted a prohibited activity to be
carried on in a building or part of the
building owned or rented by that
individual was liable to the same
punishment. Possession of any
gambling equipment, such as a deck of
cards, was to be punished with a fine
or a one- to six-months’ term in the
county jail, or both. 23

As we have already seen, measures like
these were too strict to be effective and
too difficult to enforce. Even in
seventeenth century England people were
free to play some games: not so in 1910
Nevada. However, over the next few years
the 1909 law was gradually watered
down. Moody discusses this at length, but
there are two key points that I would like
to emphasize here. Firstly, the various
amendments to the 1909 law in 1911,
1913, and 1915 made the legal situation
extremely complex to the extent that it is
debatable if players (or indeed officials)
would have known exactly where they
stood as regards particular gambling
practices. Secondly, a crucial distinction
was made between ‘social’ and banking
games: the former were generally
permitted, whereas the latter were not. In
1911, games such as whist and bridge
were permitted; and by 1913 ‘Poker,
stud-horse poker, five hundred, solo and
whist, where the deal alternated and no
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percentage was taken by the house or
operator, were specifically exempted
from the gambling prohibition’. 24 Players
of social games were not given a
completely free hand, however, for
playing for stakes of more than $2 was
forbidden. 25

A brief excursus about the distinction
between ‘social’ games and (variously)
banking, percentage, or ‘mercantile’ games
might be worthwhile here, for this distinction
was not new. 26 In eighteenth century England
fast-paced, high stakes, banking games like
faro that were largely or purely reliant on
chance were heavily criticised because they
were seen to lead to rapid and large losses
and turned gaming from a ‘private, non-profit
making, and occasional activity’ into a
commercial enterprise. 27 In contrast, games
of cards played for small stakes, often in
domestic surroundings, and among family
and friends generally escaped criticism.
Whist, which became a favourite among
eighteenth-century middle class players, is a
perfect example of the type of game that
commentators described as ‘sociable and
harmless’. In fact, whist was so popular in
‘polite’ middling circles that it made the
fortune of Edmond Hoyle, who wrote a series
of best-selling guides to the game and also
offered lessons (hence the phrase ‘according
to Hoyle’, although, ironically, we know little
about the man himself). 28 Whist was not
always respectable; indeed, its predecessor,
whisk, was considered ‘vulgar’ until it was
refined in the early decades of the eighteenth
century. 29 The example of whist, and faro, and
the changing legal status of games in early
twentieth century Nevada invites us to think
about how the nature of gambling games and
how (and by whom) they are consumed
affects the perception and regulation of those
games.

The acceptability of social games in
Nevada was affirmed in 1919 when the
state attorney general permitted the
licensing of card rooms for social games.
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Controlling gaming through licensing, he
reasoned, would be preferable to the
immediate post-1910 situation when
much gambling had apparently been
pushed underground by the tough laws; 30
moreover, the authorities would be able
to raise money from issuing licenses. Las
Vegas was quick to get in on the act and
we can use the City Commission Minutes
to calculate how many licenses were
issued between 1919 and 1931.
(see Figure 1, page 8)

The Minutes also reveal the licensing
process. First, a potential licensee had to
fill in the relevant paperwork: license
applications were rejected if this were not
done properly. 31 Then, the license had to
be approved by both the Police and Fire
Commissioner, otherwise, as C. R. Evans
discovered, it would be denied. 32
Applications usually had to specify which
games were to be played—if the
Commissioners didn’t know exactly what
a game entailed they would request
clarification before granting a license. 33
Licenses had to be renewed quarterly: in
1929, for example, it cost $150 per
quarter for 2 tables, $250 per quarter for
3 tables, and $450 per quarter for 5
tables. 34 The size of the fees caused some
complaints as the following letter dating
from 17 April 1920 illustrates:
We the undersigned, citizens and
business men of the City of Las Vegas,
believe that the present ordinance of
the City of Las Vegas, governing the
licensing of gambling, is excessive: in
that the business done in Las Vegas
does not justify the collection of one
hundred and fifty dollars per quarter.
And unfair and unjust: in that its
collection at so much per house,
discriminates against such places of
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business which can only afford to
conduct one or two tables as against
such as can afford to conduct four or
five tables. Therefore: We the
undersigned petition that the present
ordinance by modified to reduce the
license and the same to be collected at
so much per table, instead of at so
much per house.
Signed: Al. James Cleto Aguirre Lon
Grosbeck Geo Carlin D. Pecetto John
Irish A. T. Gilmore G. Lopez John P
Miller F. J. Pearce 35

Nevertheless, several of these
petitioners held gaming licenses more or
less continuously between 1920 and
1930. 36

As we have seen, until 1931 certain games
were banned outright, including the banking
games faro and roulette (actually, this is very
reminiscent of eighteenth-century English
legislation that prohibited several ‘dangerous’
games: faro, ace of hearts, basset, and
hazard). 37 But after 1931 this was no longer
the case. Licenses still had to be applied for,
but there were hardly any restrictions on the
games that could be offered. 38 There were
also some significant changes to the licensing
process.
It is conventional wisdom that after 1931
operators of what we might call ‘mercantile’
games (‘faro, monte, roulette, keno, fan-tan,
twenty-one, black jack, seven-and-a-half, big
injun, klondlyke, craps ... or any banking or
percentage game played with cards, dice, or
any mechanical device or machine, for money
[etc.]’) were required to pay a license fee of
$50 per game per month ‘payable for three
months in advance ... to the Sheriff’. 39
Similarly, licensees of ‘social’ card games, that
is, ‘stud and draw poker, bridge, whist, solo
and pangingue [played] for money’ paid a
rate of $25 per table per month. 40 But what
only a careful reading of the Las Vegas City

Commission Minutes and the City Ordinances
reveals, and what has previously gone
unnoticed by scholars, is that the City of Las
Vegas charged additional fees on top of those
dictated by the state legislature. Indeed,
Ordinance 165 stipulated that licensees of the
aforementioned social games were required
to pay an extra $2.5 per game per month,
while operators of the mercantile games had
to pay an extra $5 per game per month ‘in
addition to [the license fees] collected by the
Sheriff of Clark County’. 41

Secondly, new restrictions were placed on
the number of gaming licenses (for table
games, rather than slots) that could be issued
in Las Vegas. Initially, there was a maximum
of six: further applications for licenses were
denied on the basis that ‘public interest
requires that no additional licenses ... are
reasonably necessary for the accommodation
of the public’. 42 When making decisions the
Board of Commissioners adhered consistently
to two main criteria: the concentration and
proximity of existing gaming houses; 43 and
the infrastructure—especially regarding
policing—that was needed to support them. A
few months later, in July, the Board agreed
‘there is a need and demand for seven ...
gaming licenses’. 44 Shortly after this decision
a new precedent was set. Roy Grimes and L.
A. Williams were initially refused a license
because the maximum of seven had already
been granted. Undeterred, Grimes and
Williams proposed that they would pay for a
‘city policeman’ for ‘at least eight hours each
day’ if the Board granted their license. An
agreement was duly reached with Grimes and
Williams paying an extra $100 on top of the
standard license fee; clearly the two men felt
the business opportunity was worth the
substantial additional costs. 45 Occasionally,
licenses were suspended if the premises were
causing a nuisance. In January 1934, for
instance, it was reported that the Big Four
was:
...a place where idle, dissolute and
itinerant persons congregate and resort;
and it appearing to the Board that the
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condition in said place arising from the
congregating therein of such persons is
detrimental to the morals of the City of
Las Vegas and conductive of insanitary
conditions; and whereas it is the opinion
of the Board of City Commissioners for
the reason aforesaid, that the said Big
Four is not a desirable or proper place for
the conduct of gambling games... 46

Because England followed a policy of
prohibition whereas Nevada adopted, for the
most part, a system of licensing, there are
inherent differences across my case studies.
But there are also some points of overlap. The
first, it seems to me, is that full prohibition
tends to push organized gambling
underground. True, gaming as carried out in
alehouses and similar establishments in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was so
prevalent that it can hardly be described a
being ‘underground’, despite its illegality. But
when we look at the types of games—usually
banking—and institutions—usually
specialized but illegal/unlicensed gaming
houses—that the authorities were really
worried about and made more of an effort to
suppress, my point about prohibition holds.
Second, historically players have been
prepared to risk severe penalties in the
pursuit of (illegal) gambling. 47 Third, there
has long been a distinction between social
and mercantile games that has influenced the
way in which gambling games and the
institutions providing them have been
perceived and regulated. Finally, it is clear
that effectively enforcing even partial antigambling legislation requires considerable
resources and manpower, something which
neither eighteenth-century England nor early
twentieth-century Nevada had.

Conclusion

After 1931 a much wider range of games
was legally available in Las Vegas and I would
like to begin this concluding section with a
few comments about faro. Faro was invented
in France in the 1600s and arrived in Britain
in the 1700s. In England faro was associated
with the social and political elites: as a fast-
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paced, high participation, chance-based game
faro quickly earned a reputation for being
‘dangerous’. 48 Faro banks ran into tens of
thousands of pounds (millions in today’s
money) and wealthy players won and lost
fortunes on the turn of a single card. 49 As
mentioned, faro was banned in England in
1738, though this did little to end the craze. 50
Ultimately it was not until the ‘Faro’s
Daughters’ scandal of the 1790s, which
damaged the reputation of several
aristocratic women, that faro began to lose its
fashionable hue. 51 Faro was probably brought
across the Atlantic by the French in the early
nineteenth century (the distinctive faro table
appears to have originated in America) and in
this new climate it became much more
socially inclusive. 52 Faro was well known in
Nevada and appears in the records on which
this paper is based: indeed, it was one of the
banking games that was consistently
legislated against before 1931, an indication,
perhaps, that it had retained at least some of
its ‘dangerous’ allure. Strangely, faro was a
casualty of ‘wide open’ gaming, possibly
because (as in eighteenth century England) it
had become too associated with cheating or
maybe because ‘as the industry became more
established ... the selection of games
narrowed appreciably’. 53 The example of faro
(which is only one of many) suggests that
tracking the cultural transmission of popular
games and the way in which they were
adapted in different socio-economic and
cultural contexts might form a useful strand
in wider comparative histories of gambling.
A short paper such as this is bound to be
impressionistic and is certainly not without
methodological problems. But what I hope to
have shown is that comparative approaches
to the history of gambling have the potential
to shed light on the debates and issues that
shaped attitudes and policies to gambling in
the past, and may continue to do so in the
future. 54
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Figure 1: Licences Issued, 1919-1930
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